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Abstract 
 
There are some risks in producing public philosophy. We don’t want to misrepresent the work of philosophy 
or mislead readers into thinking they have learned all they need to know from a single, short book or article. 
The potential benefits, though, outweigh the risks. Public philosophy can disseminate important ideas and 
enhance appreciation for the difficult and complex work of philosophers. Popular writing is often less precise, 
lacking in fine detail and elaboration, but it can still be accurate (in the sense of being “on target”). People 
often need a simplified account to get an initial understanding. Whatever one thinks of the role of jargon in 
scholarly writing, its place should be minimal in popular writing. If physicists can write books of popular 
science with virtually no equations, philosophers can write books for a general audience with limited jargon.  
     
 
 
 
Public philosophy, such as the Blackwell Philosophy and Pop Culture Series that I edit, has 
its share of critics. Elsewhere I have explained and defended the interpretation of pop 
culture as a vehicle for disseminating philosophy.1 On this occasion I would like to take the 
opportunity to defend the style of presentation and the simplification of ideas and arguments 
that is common to my series and other works of public philosophy.  
 
Public philosophy takes a hit from some academic critics who disparage its style of writing 
as attention-seeking simplification. Many critics don’t regard it as philosophy at all.2 Maybe 
it’s not. Maybe it’s more like reporting on philosophy. But does Stephen Hawking’s A Brief 
History of Time count as science? Even if it doesn’t, it certainly serves the worthwhile 
purpose of explaining the cosmos in a way that is accessible and interesting to the general 
public. Hawking’s book is remarkable not just for its success but for its surprising lack of 
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mathematics. If Hawking can explain physics without equations, then certainly philosophers 
can explain metaphysics without symbolic logic. It’s a challenge, though, in ways that 
critics may not realize. It is easier to explain physics using mathematics because much of 
the work has already been done by the reader in coming to understand the mathematics. The 
physics in A Brief History of Time may be simplified, shorn as it is of mathematical 
apparatus, but only a pedant would complain that it is inaccurate as a result. The average 
reader gets a valid sense of the subject matter and many have been inspired to learn more.  
 
So if physics can be simplified appropriately for a general audience, then why not 
philosophy? Popular writing is often less precise, lacking in fine detail and elaboration, but 
it can still be accurate (in the sense of being “on target”). People often need a simplified 
account to get an initial understanding. Later, with their interest prompted, they can learn 
the more complex version. So, for example, a work of public philosophy may not consider 
every possible way in which utilitarianism can be refined to meet the objections of its 
critics, but to demand that it do so is to miss the point. The point is to make it accessible so 
that ideas can spread beyond the ivory tower. 
 
One of the aims of writing for the Blackwell series is to teach without being “teachy.” That 
is, we don’t want to be pedantic or preachy. We are not aiming for the scholarly innovation 
of academic journal articles, nor are we producing classroom lectures. Rather, we are 
aiming to create a sense of discovery. The best popular writing often makes the reader feel 
like a collaborator in figuring things out, which, of course, is often true of the best 
classroom teaching as well. None of this is easy. Consider the plight of Plato’s escaped 
prisoner who returns to the cave from the world outside and is not able to make out the 
shapes of the shadows on the wall. His eyes must readjust to see the shadows; he must 
speak in terms of them if he is to communicate effectively. This is the task of philosophers 
in writing for the public. Having learned the jargon and rules of discourse for academic 
philosophy, they must take what they have learned in that form and translate it into the 
language of everyday life. This is the only way they can hope to both teach and be taught by 
their non-academic readers and interlocutors. 
 
Some critics may complain, though, that we should not speak in terms of the shadows. 
Philosophy is difficult by its very nature and any attempt to simplify it or make it easy just 
distorts the subject matter. Of course it is true that, for example, the mind-body problem is 
complex and that no easy answers suggest themselves. But that does not mean that public 
philosophy should avoid an elementary discussion of the mind-body problem in which some 
attempted solutions are presented in their most basic form. We all need to start somewhere 
in developing our understanding of the problem. Some people might like the experience of 
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being thrown into the deep end of the pool and being forced to swim, but most prefer to 
begin where the water is not over their heads.  
 
Still, it may be objected, by presenting a simplified version of philosophy we risk sending 
the message to readers that this is “all you need to know.” Admittedly, there is some risk of 
this, but it is the same risk that we take in teaching Introduction to Philosophy. The clear 
message of the intro course and of most public philosophy is that this is not all you need to 
know, but rather that this is an introduction, one that will hopefully prompt you to want to 
know more. On a related note, some critics are concerned that simplified accounts of 
philosophy make the discipline appear frivolous and undermine the hard work of 
professional philosophers. Such concerns are misplaced, however. No one thinks physics is 
frivolous after reading popular science books. If professional philosophy is misperceived as 
frivolous, we need to look elsewhere for the source of the misperception.   
 
Nonetheless, some critics will maintain that nothing worthwhile comes easy, so philosophy 
should be hard. Wrestling with ideas is hard enough, though. In doing public philosophy we 
don’t need to compound the difficulty by presenting the ideas in needlessly complex forms 
and prose. People need to walk before they can run; they need an elementary version of 
philosophy before moving on to a more advanced discussion. 
 
Lack of clarity in philosophical prose is sometimes claimed as necessary because of the 
nature of philosophy. But this is rarely so. Analytic and continental philosophy may seem to 
be divided in part on the issue of clarity where analytic philosophy strives for clarity and 
continental philosophy seems to revel in obscurity. But this characterization is facile, and 
even if it were accurate it would make little difference to the average person who finds them 
both impenetrable. Thus, in my capacity as editor of the Blackwell Philosophy and Pop 
Culture Series, I am open to any topic, issue, or problem addressed by either analytic or 
continental philosophy (or any other tradition) as long as the author can explain it in terms 
that are interesting and intelligible to the average reader. No philosophical topic is 
automatically excluded from consideration, though many topics in academic philosophy are 
of interest almost exclusively to other philosophers who are already interested in a particular 
field or issue. Just as not every topic works well in most Introduction to Philosophy courses, 
so too not every topic works well in most public philosophy books. Most professors do not 
teach Wittgenstein, Heidegger, modal logic, or deconstruction in their intro courses. But 
some do, and some of these have success. Likewise, such topics can be considered in public 
philosophy books; we simply need to be careful in doing so. Style and presentation matter. 
 
Essays Philos (2014)15:1                                                                                                                   Irwin | 80 
 
 
 
Writing with a sense of fun or with an irreverent sense of humor is verboten in academic 
philosophy, but it is just the kind of thing that enlivens a work of public philosophy and 
elicits the good will of readers. The writing itself can be fun but it is not easy. Fred Astaire 
is often praised as making dancing look easy, but no one worked as hard as Astaire to make 
it look easy. Following in Astaire’s footsteps, the ideal for the public philosopher is to 
produce a text that reads so easily that it seems to have been written easily. By contrast, 
many philosophers assume that because something is difficult to read it must have been 
difficult to write. Sometimes that is true, but it does not necessarily mean that the author 
could not have worked even harder to make the text easier to read and comprehend. It seems 
that the more established a philosopher becomes, the more entitled s/he feels to produce 
writing that will require an inordinate amount of work to read and comprehend. Indeed, s/he 
may even feel this is what is expected. 
 
By contrast, in writing chapters for the Blackwell Philosophy and Pop Culture Series 
authors are asked to be ever mindful of the reader. We want the reader to wrestle with ideas 
not prose. Referring to William Strunk in the introduction to The Elements of Style, E.B. 
White writes that “Will felt the reader was in serious trouble most of the time, a man 
floundering in a swamp, and that it was the duty of anyone attempting to write English to 
drain this swamp quickly and get his man up on dry ground, or at least throw him a rope.”3 
It is Strunk’s sensitivity to the plight of the reader that should drive us to pay attention to 
“elements of style” that ordinarily do not concern philosophers in their academic writing.  
 
In academic journal articles and books, introductions are rarely enticing. They largely take 
for granted that the reader is already interested in reading the text and simply provide a 
roadmap of what lies ahead. In public philosophy, by contrast, we cannot take the reader’s 
interest for granted. Instead we need to give readers an intriguing introduction, the kind that 
leaves them feeling they must read more. Generally, this means eschewing the academic 
convention of the roadmap, which can be overwhelming for a reader who is unfamiliar with 
the terrain. Better is to give the reader an introduction that moves her enough to put her trust 
in the writer to take her along on a tour of mutual discovery. Moving beyond the 
introduction, little things matter, i.e. we need to keep things little. Short paragraphs, 
sections, and chapters give readers a sense of progress and accomplishment, which is 
helpful in encouraging them to continue reading. Finally, readers need a satisfying 
conclusion, the kind that leaves them feeling time has been well spent. 
 
Newspaper editor Barney Kilgore liked to remind his writers that, “the easiest thing in the 
world for a reader to do is to stop reading.”4 Unfortunately, the very idea of writing for a 
reader is foreign to most philosophers. Occasionally some philosophical stylists have 
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written partly for personal expression, but rarely has a great philosopher in recent times 
written to be understood by as wide an audience as possible.5 Alas, most philosophers 
would seem to be happy if they were truly understood by only the smallest possible 
audience as long as that audience consisted of the very brightest or most knowledgeable 
people. By contrast, public philosophy attempts to produce “articles that could be read—not 
articles that could be figured out given a sufficient investment of time and energy, but 
actually read.”6 This is how Timothy Taylor describes the mission of the journal he edits, 
the Journal of Economic Perspectives, an economics journal that aims to publish “essays on 
cutting-edge topics, often by prominent authors, but doing so in an expository style that 
minimizes specialized jargon and technique and thus is accessible to a broad readership of 
economists.”7  It is challenging to write for a broad audience, such as all professional 
economists or all professional philosophers, but it is even more challenging to write for the 
broadest audience of all, the general public.  
 
Partly because we teach to a captive audience, academics aren’t fully sensitive to readers. 
We are not accustomed to winning over an audience and keeping them interested. Most 
students are motivated mainly by grades, and when we make special efforts to connect with 
our students we may feel we are appealing to the lowest common denominator. I’ve heard 
some colleagues say they have come to accept that they must spoon feed their students, but 
they draw the line at moving their students’ jaws to help them chew. Fair enough. We 
should uphold standards in the classroom; we should not teach to the bottom. Rather, we 
should attempt to inspire the bottom to rise to the level of the top. Personally, I like to think 
of myself as teaching to the top half of the class and challenging the bottom half to rise to 
that level. But my gauge is probably inaccurate. More likely, at least at times, I’m teaching 
to the top third or quarter; sometimes, regrettably, I’m teaching only to the top two or three 
students—and this is when I’m trying to do otherwise. Once I realized this, though, it 
allowed me to factor in my tendency to overestimate how accessible my presentation is and 
thereby improve my teaching. Thankfully, over repeated iterations of Introduction to 
Philosophy I have gained a more accurate sense of my level of accessibility. But when 
teaching a new course for the first time gauging accessibility is always a challenge. 
 
Of course, it is also a challenge to present ideas at the right level of accessibility in writing 
public philosophy such that the reader is challenged appropriately without being 
discouraged or turned off. In a way, writing for a popular audience is easier than teaching. 
Unlike students in an Introduction to Philosophy course, readers of public philosophy are 
not filling a requirement and are not looking for a grade. They are looking to learn and to 
form their own views. Such readers are the ideal audience that college instructors dream of. 
This makes things harder, though, because, unlike students, readers can get up and walk out 
Essays Philos (2014)15:1                                                                                                                   Irwin | 82 
 
 
 
at any time with no penalty. All they stand to lose is the cost of the text—which is often 
zero in the case of online articles and blogs—and whatever time they have invested so far. 
Many readers are quite ready to cut their losses if the writer does not reach out and engage 
them. So, if we care about philosophy being known and appreciated on a larger scale, and if 
we care to have dialogue with people outside the academy, we need to make public 
philosophy accessible.  
 
In writing, as well as in teaching, we academics often miss our mark when it comes to 
clarity and accessibility. We are perhaps encouraged in this, or at least not corrected, 
because our colleagues who read our journal articles are motivated to work hard to extract 
information. Thus, as scholars, we tend to overestimate how accessible what we say and 
write is. We almost always err on the side of being too complex and as a result end up being 
less accessible than we wish to be. In general, what we think should be accessible to any 
professional philosopher is often accessible only to specialists in our field. What we think 
should be accessible to advanced students is really accessible only to professional 
philosophers. And what we think should be accessible to anyone is really accessible only to 
advanced students.  
 
Jargon is the number one offender. Jargon use in any profession becomes so natural that 
people forget they are doing it; the task of the popular writer is to become hyper-aware of 
jargon and curtail it whenever possible. My experience in editing has been that often, 
though not always, more prominent scholars have a more difficult time writing for a general 
audience. They are accustomed to expressing themselves in ways that are understood only 
by bright colleagues and students. When their writing is obscure their academic readers take 
it as their own fault for not understanding and work hard to achieve comprehension. As a 
result, prominent scholars often have a greater challenge in adjusting for a general audience. 
Taylor recounts that “A wise colleague once said to me that jargon and technical expression 
always have two uses: 1) to streamline and clarify the communication of concepts between 
specialists, and 2) for specialists to identify themselves as an in-group, while impressing and 
excluding outsiders. All of us are prone to the belief that we are only using jargon from the 
highest motives, to pursue intellectual clarity, while quietly feeling the inner glow of being 
within the charmed circle of jargon-users.”8  
 
To get a feel for what it may be like for an average reader coming to philosophy for the first 
time, all a philosopher needs to do is read an article in a highly selective and highly 
specialized journal well outside his or her area of expertise. There is value in the writing of 
such articles as long as the communication is efficient and the jargon is not gratuitous. 
There is also the danger, though, that out of envy for the prestige and success of the 
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sciences, we in the humanities attempt to ape their anti-style. For a time, Denis Dutton, the 
late editor of the journal Philosophy and Literature, waggishly ran a bad writing contest for 
the worst sentence in an academic publication. There was no shortage of submissions. In 
philosophy, examples leap to mind, but they tend to come from outside one’s own 
specialization and tradition. Dutton believed that jargon was naturally at home in the 
sciences and even the social sciences, where it really does capture phenomena and facilitate 
communication, but that it should be used sparingly in the humanities. Thus we have 
“‘Dutton’s Razor,’ the principle that jargon that does not illuminate or elucidate but rather 
mystifies and obscures should be stricken from the lexicon of sincere and intelligent 
humanists.”9  
 
Whatever one thinks of the role of jargon in scholarly writing, its place should be minimal 
in popular writing. If physicists can write books of popular science with virtually no 
equations, philosophers can write books for a general audience with limited jargon. In fact, 
it is a common experience that being compelled to write that way can lead to a deeper 
understanding on the part of the writer. All good teachers report that there are concepts and 
ideas that they did not fully appreciate or understand until they taught them. Likewise in 
writing for a reader to understand and appreciate our subject matter we can often come to 
understand and appreciate the subject matter more deeply ourselves.10 As Taylor says, “The 
underlying lesson here is that knowledge and the exposition of that knowledge are not fully 
separable, and that lesson applies to faculty as well as to students. Lack of clarity usually 
reflects a less-than-full understanding.”11  
 
In conclusion, then, there are some risks in producing public philosophy. We don’t want to 
misrepresent the work of philosophy or mislead readers into thinking they have learned all 
they need to know from a single, short book or article. The potential benefits, though, 
outweigh the risks. Public philosophy can disseminate important ideas and enhance 
appreciation for the difficult and complex work of philosophers. Additionally, in writing for 
the public, philosophers can actually improve their own comprehension of their subject 
matter and potentially open lines of communication with unexpected dialogue partners.12 
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